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1 Introduction
The conventional wisdom regarding the role of time in quantum theory is
this: “time is a parameter in quantum mechanics and not an operator”
(Duncan & Janssen, 2012, p. 53). The reason for this is ‘Pauli’s theorem,’
a collection of results that show that (subject to a mild restriction on the
Hamiltonian operator) conventional quantum mechanics does not permit the
definition of a time observable, i.e. a self-adjoint operator canonically conju-
gate to energy.1 If one wishes to have time appear as a genuine observable
of the theory, then this is obviously a problem, called by some “the problem
of time in quantum mechanics” (Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011; Olkhovsky,
2011). Hilgevoord’s (2005) attempted resolution of the problem rests on his
rejection of a particular motivation that one might have for wishing to re-
gard time as a genuine observable. Hilgevoord’s argument is essentially this:
there is nothing problematic about time being represented by a parameter
rather than an operator since space is represented by a parameter rather
than an operator as well.
In a recent historical survey, Hilgevoord (2005) contends that the demand
that time be an observable can be traced back to a conceptual confusion
common among the progenitors of quantum mechanics, in particular Dirac,
Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger, and von Neumann. Hilgevoord claims that the
expectation of the authors of quantum mechanics that time should be an
observable was due to this confusion between space and position: led by the
role of position in the theory as an observable, they were mistakenly led to
the idea that time should be observable too. He traces the source of the
1See Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi (1981) for a rigorous derivation of this result.
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confusion to the frequent use of the spatial co-ordinates (x, y, z) to denote
the spectral values of the position observable of a single particle (qx, qy, qz).
When presented with an operator whose spectral values appear to cor-
respond to points of space, it is natural to expect also an operator whose
spectral values correspond to instants of time. And given the expectation
of these authors that quantum mechanics would ultimately be a relativistic
theory, it is reasonable to demand of a theory set in space-time that time
and space should appear on the same footing. However, as Hilgevoord points
out, the spectral values of position are not identical with spatial points—this
correspondence is only valid for a system comprising a single particle since
in general the dimension of configuration space (and so the spectrum of the
position observable) is 3N , where N is the number of particles. Once this
confusion is made manifest and it is realized that time t (a parameter) is
to be contrasted with space (x, y, z) (also parameters) the apparent asym-
metry is removed and so the justification for regarding time as an operator
(i.e. an observable) is removed, or so Hilgevood claims. This leads him to
dismiss later developments, such as the more recent use of POVMs (Posi-
tive Operator Valued Measures) to define (generalized) time observables, as
conceptually confused for the same reason.
Now, with regard to this particular justification for regarding time as
an operator, I agree that Hilgevoord offers an apt diagnosis: what is being
contrasted here is not time and space, but time and position. But while
I agree wholeheartedly that it would be a mistake to confuse space, time
and position in this way, I am not convinced that this was a confusion to
which many (or perhaps any) of the authors of quantum theory were prone.
Indeed, Hilgevoord acknowledges that there were other reasons which led
to the expectation that temporal properties were apt for representation by
operators. It is my view that these other reasons for defining time opera-
tors were more important to those authors—I will claim that some remain
compelling today—and thus are not so easily dismissed as resulting from a
simple conceptual error.
In this paper I will be concerned with analyzing in more detail how ideas
and expectations regarding the role of time in the theory arose and evolved
in the early years of quantum mechanics (from 1925-27). The general theme
will be that expectations which seemed reasonable from the point of view
of matrix mechanics and Dirac’s q-number formalism became implausible
in light of Dirac-Jordan transformation theory, and were dashed by von
Neumann’s Hilbert space formalism which came to replace it. Nonetheless,
I will identify two concerns that remain relevant today, and which blunt the
force of Hilgevoord’s main claim.
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First, I point out Dirac’s use of an ‘extended’ classical configuration
space, which includes time and energy as conjugate variables from the get-go,
is not subject to Pauli’s theorem, and, moreover, his motivations for using
this extended configuration space are not merely relativistic, as Hilgevoord
claims. This indicates another way to avoid this ‘problem of time:’ by
defining an ‘extended Schro¨dinger equation’ for functions of space and time
we can have a quantum theory in which time and energy are represented by
canonically conjugate observables, as Dirac had originally intended. Second,
I contend that the temporal quantities under consideration concerned not
time in the abstract, but the time of particular events (initially so-called
‘quantum jumps’). If ‘the’ time operator concerns the location of an event
in time, then it is no false contrast to draw an analogy with the position
observable, which concerns the location of an event in space (the event in
question being something like ‘the particle’s being here’). I will also attempt
to show how these considerations are related, in that exploring the second
claim (that the time of an event is an observable quantity) leads naturally to
the first (that quantum theory should be defined on extended configuration
space).
2 A Brief History of Time in Quantum Mechanics
2.1 Time in Matrix Mechanics
The expectation that energy and time must form a canonically conjugate
pair arose from the close relation of the new quantum mechanics to the
action-angle form of classical (Hamiltonian) mechanics that inspired it. In
Heisenberg’s famous Umdeu¨tung paper of 1925, time plays an almost iden-
tical role in the description of the new quantum variables as it did in the
specific classical cases he sought to re-interpret. The classical equation of
motion, Hamilton’s equation in action-angle co-ordinates (J,w), reads
dw
dt
=
∂H
∂J
;
dJ
dt
= −∂H
∂w
.
The time dependence in action-angle form is particularly simple since the
canonical transformation into these co-ordinates is chosen such that J˙ = 0
and w˙ = v0, a constant. Thus J is time independent and w is linear in t.
This being the case, a general solution x(t) of these equations (for periodic
systems) may be Fourier decomposed into a sum over components labeled
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by amplitude and phase:
x(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
∑
τ±1
Aτ (Jn)e
2piiτvnt.
So it was this special form of classical Hamiltonian mechanics, one in which
time dependence takes an especially simple form, that provided the basis
of the emerging quantum kinematics. The time evolution of these solutions
was entirely confined to a complex phase, and so it was to be in the new
quantum theory.
In the matrix mechanics of Born & Jordan (1925) kinematical quantities
are represented by Hermitian matrices whose time dependence takes the
same form,
p(t) = p(nm)e2piiv(nm)t; q(t) = q(nm)e2piiv(nm)t.
Having obtained a matrix representation of these kinematical quantities, it
follows from the relation
v(nm) = Wn −Wm
that the time derivative of an arbitrary matrix function g(pq) may be writ-
ten
g˙ =
i
~
[(Wn −Wm)g(mn)] = i~(Wg − gW ), (1)
where W = δmnWn is a diagonal matrix (pp. 288-9). Since the diagonal
form of W was critical to the validity of this relation, the major practical
difficulty of applying the new quantum mechanics to a particular system
with a classical Hamiltonian of known functional form became essentially
that of finding a representation in which the quantum mechanical energy
took diagonal form.
By writing the Hamiltonian matrix H as a function of p and q Born and
Jordan derived the following dynamical equations for quantum variables in
the same form as Hamilton’s equations in classical mechanics,(
∂H
∂q
=
)
p˙ =
i
~
[Hp− pH] ;
(
−∂H
∂p
=
)
q˙ =
i
~
[Hq − qH].
They argued that this same relation holds true of a general function g(pq)
as well, yielding the so-called Heisenberg equation of motion,
g˙ =
i
~
[Hg − gH], (2)
4
which immediately gave the result that H˙ = 0, i.e. that energy is conserved.
There is in this formalism no reason to suppose that time could not be
represented by a matrix, and the fact that in classical mechanics w behaves
very much like a time parameter is suggestive of the idea that there should
be a matrix t(qp) canonically conjugate to H. Indeed, if one demands that
this matrix t vary linearly with time then (2) appears to imply that it is
canonically conjugate to energy H since
t˙ = 1⇒ [Ht− tH] = i/~.
2.2 Time as a q-number: Dirac’s Classical Analogy
Dirac, working in relative isolation in Cambridge, was led to the same dy-
namical equations by pursuing a structurally richer classical analogy. Like
Born and Jordan he recognized the non-commutativity of the multiplicative
operation as the key feature of Heisenberg’s quantum variables, but rather
than focusing on a particular representation of the variables, Dirac’s ap-
proach led him to identify shared algebraic structures of the classical and
quantum theories. We will briefly follow his development of the theory in his
initial paper ‘The Fundamental Equations of Quantum Mechanics’ (Dirac,
1925).
Whereas Born and Jordan’s derivative operation came for free from
their use of matrix multiplication, Dirac sought to define his operation al-
gebraically from the two basic conditions such an operation much satisfy:
distributivity and the Leibniz law. He shows that the operation ax − xa,
which is to say the commutator of two ‘q-numbers’ (a nomenclature intro-
duced in a subsequent paper) satisfies these two conditions and so can be
interpreted as a differentiation of x with respect to some parameter v. For a
special case, Dirac let a be the diagonal matrix representing the energies of
the allowed transitions, then v is the time and this returns x˙, just as Born
and Jordan had found.
But in contrast to Born and Jordan, who built up their dynamical equa-
tions from matrix operations acting according to the quantum condition,
Dirac instead sought to establish a correspondence between classical and
quantum operations by setting up a structural analogy between the two
theories. He argued that as the quantum numbers become large the quan-
tum commutator corresponds to the classical Poisson bracket (multiplied by
a factor of −i~ ).
{x, y} =
∑
r
{
∂x
∂qr
∂y
∂pr
− ∂y
∂qr
∂x
∂pr
}
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The Poisson bracket is a canonical invariant, meaning that it takes the same
value evaluated in any canonical co-ordinates. Moreover, the Poisson bracket
expressions satisfy the two demands he placed on an operation of differen-
tiation. This suggested to Dirac that the quantum commutator represented
the same operation, valid for non-commuting ‘q-numbers’ — his own version
of the correspondence principle.
Once this correspondence was established, the quantum equation of
motion (2) followed immediately from the corresponding classical Poisson
bracket by mere transcription according to the new quantum schema. The
difference in Dirac’s approach was manifest in his ability to import results
from classical mechanics directly into his theory (although he was soon to
see that his translation procedure led to ordering ambiguities). Since action-
angle variables are classical conjugates with {w, J} = 1 (having been reached
by a canonical transformation) the suggestion is very strong indeed that w
and J , considered as q-numbers, must also be a canonical pair. Indeed,
obtaining numerical results from Dirac’s theory required transcription of
the results of the corresponding classical problem, expressed in action-angle
form.
2.2.1 ‘Relativity Quantum Mechanics’
When Dirac came to consider relativistic quantum physics his approach
was, naturally enough, to define a suitable relativistic classical description
in terms of Poisson Brackets, and then apply his quantum translation pre-
scription (Dirac, 1926b).2 It is worth quoting in full Dirac’s description of
this procedure and his view of the significance of defining suitable classical
canonical variables.
It will be observed that the notion of canonical variables plays
a very fundamental part in the theory. Any attempt to extend
the domain of the present quantum mechanics must be preceded
by the introduction of canonical variables into the corresponding
classical theory, with a reformulation of the classical theory with
P.B.’s [Poisson Brackets] instead of differential coefficients. The
object of the present paper is to obtain in this way the extension
of the quantum mechanics to systems for which the Hamiltonian
involves the time explicitly and to relativity mechanics. (pp.
406-7)
2Note that this work was done before he was aware of Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics.
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In the following section, entitled “Quantum Time,” Dirac immediately claims
that “[t]he principle of relativity demands that the time shall be treated
on the same footing as the other variables and so it must therefore be a q-
number” (p. 407). In order to do so, Dirac defines a classical Poisson bracket
that includes time t as a variable along with it’s canonical conjugate −W
(i.e. , minus the total energy).
{x, y} =
∑
r
{
∂x
∂qr
∂y
∂pr
− ∂y
∂qr
∂x
∂pr
}
− ∂x
∂W
∂y
∂t
+
∂y
∂W
∂x
∂t
In defining this Poisson Bracket, the set of canonical variables is extended
by two to include t and −W , and so the dynamics of the system now takes
place in this extended phase space. The physical solutions are defined by
the demand that the Hamiltonian (defined on the extended phase space)
vanishes with the total energy W , what is called today a constraint equation,
H −W = 0. (3)
So while t and −W are variables conjugate on the extended phase space
(leading to the quantum commutators detailed in Dirac’s equation (7)) the
dynamics of the system are confined to a subspace of the phase space defined
by this constraint (the constraint surface).3 As we have seen, Dirac is explicit
here that relativistic considerations motivate his introduction of time as a
q-number, but also he cites the time dependence of the Hamiltonian as a
motivation. There is nothing about the use of extended phase space which
implies that the system in question is relativistic, as it is just the fact that
the Poisson Bracket is defined on the extended phase space which implies
time and energy are conjugate variables, not the fact that the Hamiltonian
is relativistic. Hilgevoord (2005) regards the use of relativistic arguments
to motivate the demand that energy and time be canonical conjugates in
quantum mechanics as misguided due to the limited role that relativistic
particle mechanics plays in classical and quantum physics. Be that as it
may (and Dirac’s rhetoric here notwithstanding) it remains the case that
the conjugacy of energy and time has little to do with the fact that a system
3In fact, Dirac notes that the conjugacy relations may be inconsistent with the con-
straint, but this is just to say that the relations don’t necessarily hold for functions on the
constraint surface. Without the Schro¨dinger equation in hand, it is not yet clear that the
dynamical equation is in fact a wave equation satisfied by certain functions, whereas the
relations of conjuagacy hold generally for functions of the extended configuration space.
It is also worth emphasizing that, whereas position and momentum are conjugate vari-
ables on both the unextended and extended phase space, energy and time are conjugate
variables on the extended phase space alone.
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is relativistic, and everything to do with the fact that the system’s dynamics
are defined in the extended phase space. Although in the case of a relativistic
system the use of extended phase space is unavoidable, it is clear that Dirac
also viewed the (non-relativistic) Schro¨dinger equation as a wave equation
defined on functions of space and time, i.e., as an equation in the extended
configuration space.
2.2.2 The Time-Dependent Schro¨dinger Equation
Introduced by means of an optical-mechanical analogy, Schro¨dinger’s wave
mechanics was initially met with hostility from the matrix mechanics camp.
However, as we have seen, Dirac’s q-number approach was more general, and
so more flexible for extension in other directions. Following Heisenberg’s dis-
covery of a connection between the solutions of Schro¨dinger’s wave equation
and the energy values that appeared in the time dependence of the matrix
values for a dynamical variable, Dirac seized on Schro¨dinger’s new approach,
recognizing the means to free himself from the overly restrictive reliance on
classical methods, and overcome the problems introduced by the degener-
acy of energy levels arising in systems of many particles (Darrigol, 1993,
pp. 329–333). Unencumbered by the conceptual baggage of Schro¨dinger’s
painstaking path through classical physics, Dirac’s starting point was the
realization that quantum systems could be described by functions obeying
a linear wave equation, and he quickly moved to explore the consequences.
In a remarkable paper ‘On the Theory of Quantum Mechanics’ (Dirac,
1926a) he laid out the essentials of an approach which would serve as the ba-
sis for the later integration of wave and matrix mechanics. He demonstrated
the power of this new formalism by deriving the Bose-Einstein and Fermi-
Dirac statistics for an assembly of systems from elementary conditions on
the permutation of the wavefunctions describing the individual systems. The
foundation of this approach was the recognition that Schro¨dinger’s theory
allowed for the explicit representation of conjugate variables as differential
operators. To write down the time-dependent wave equation, therefore,
merely required him to make the substitutions
pr = −i~ ∂
∂x
; −W = −i~ ∂
∂t
into the equation (3) above, treated as a wave equation, i.e.,
(H −W )ψ = 0. (4)
Hence Dirac’s derivation of the time-dependent equation depended on the
extended phase space description described in (Dirac, 1926b). To explain:
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the replacement of the conjugate variable −W by the corresponding differ-
ential operator relies on the existence of a space of functions of t on which it
acts. The implication is that t is also a q-number, an operator that acts by
multiplication on this space of functions of extended configuration space.4
In order to set up a correspondence with the Heisenberg equations of
motion Dirac is required to fix the value of the variable t, but in doing so he
makes it quite clear that the functions (or superpositions of functions) that
satisfy the general wave equation are functions of time and space.
As an example of a constant of integration of the dynamical
system take the value x(t0) that an arbitrary function x of the
p’s and q’s, W and t has at a specified time t = t0. The matrix
that represents x(t0) will consist of elements each of which is a
function of t0. (Dirac, 1926a, p. 665)
Under the special condition that the Hamiltonian is time independent (i.e.,
a constant of integration), so that the energy W has a diagonal matrix
representation, Dirac was able to derive the time dependence of the matrix
elements of a q-number x (although, as he is at pains to point out, only
for a Hamiltonian that does not involve time explicitly). This reverses the
logical order of Born and Jordan’s derivation of (1), which assumed the time
dependence by means of Heisenberg’s classical analogy. Dirac here instead
shows how this time dependence arises from the dynamics of the quantum
mechanics, that is, the Schro¨dinger equation.
However, he explicitly states that he views this separation of time and
space as inessential, and describes the alternative (solving directly in terms
of the extended phase space without considering variation in t) as more
fundamental:
It should be noticed that the choice of the time t as the variable
that occurs in the elements of the matrices representing variable
quantities is quite arbitrary, and any function of t and the q’s
that increases steadily would do. . . . It is probable that the rep-
resentation of a constant of integration of the system by a matrix
of constant elements is more fundamental than the representa-
tion by a matrix whose elements are functions of some variable
such as t . . . (ibid. p. 666)
In summary, we can see that there was another motivation, independent
from relativistic considerations, which led Dirac to regard energy and time
4Note again that the space of functions on which W acts is not identical with the space
of wavefunctions that that satisfy the wave equation (4).
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as conjugate variables: his expression for the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation required that energy be represented by a differential operator d/dt,
which was defined on a space of functions of time. Note also that Dirac did
not yet have an dynamics that could apply to time-dependent Hamiltonians,
since the treatment he had given assumed from the outset that the allowed
energies were time independent.
2.2.3 Time in Transformation Theory
In Dirac’s presentation of transformation theory, ‘The Physical Interpreta-
tion of the Quantum Dynamics’ (1927) it is apparently assumed from the
outset that the theory involves the split between space and time that had
been introduced in the earlier paper.
These matrix elements [of a dynamical variable g] are functions
of the time only. In the present paper we shall not take rela-
tivity mechanics into account, and shall count the time variable
wherever it occurs as merely a parameter (a c-number). (Dirac,
1927, p. 625)
In the course of the development of the theory, which Dirac intends to
to provide a generalization of matrix mechanics to address non-periodic
systems and continuous observables, Dirac makes the (oft-quoted) crucial
link with Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics:
The eigenfunctions of Schro¨dinger’s wave equation are just the
transformation functions . . . that enable one to transform from
the (q) scheme of matrix representation to a scheme in which the
Hamiltonian is a diagonal matrix (Dirac, 1927, p. 635; emphasis
in the original).
These eigenfunctions are in fact the energy eigenstates, so what Dirac has
found at this stage is the connection to Schro¨dinger’s time-independent wave
equation, which appears in the following form,
H(q′r,−i~
∂
∂q′r
)(q′r/α
′) = H(α′)(q′r/α
′). (5)
It remains for him to provide a link to the time-dependent equation that he
had derived previously, i.e., the Heisenberg equations of motion. Remark-
ably, he does not do so: in his presentation of the theory the time dependence
of the quantum variables is assumed (condition (ii) of p. 327, ibid.). Nei-
ther does he try to derive the time-dependent Schrd¨inger equation as we
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would recognize it today. In fact, the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
appears almost by accident; the only place Dirac explicitly considers time
dependence of the solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation is in considering
time varying Hamiltonians: first in general (p. 635) and then as a perturba-
tion (p. 640).
Dirac had, at this first stage, only identified his transformations with en-
ergy eigenstates, and relied on the relation to the (extended) classical phase
space to consider dynamics. The time variation of the quantum variables
he considered—“constants of integration”—was particularly simple on this
pseudo-classical picture, so long as the Hamiltonian was constant with time,
and thus could be given by the Heisenberg equations of motion (2). How-
ever, if the Hamiltonian is time-dependent then the matrix scheme cannot
have this simple time dependence. Dirac explains the problem as follows:
For systems in which the Hamiltonian involves the time explic-
itly, there will be in general no matrix scheme with respect to
which H is a diagonal matrix, since there will be no set of con-
stants of integration that do not involve the time explicitly. (p.
635)
Yet the result of the derivation that he enters into to address this problem,
is an equation for a Hamiltonian H that does not explicitly involve time—
an equation that we immediately recognize today as the time-dependent
Schrodinger equation for a wavefunction (q′/α′),
H
(
qr,−i~ ∂
∂qr
)
(q′/α′) = H(qr, pr)(q′α′) = i~
∂
∂t
(q′/α′). (6)
The form of this equation (numbered (12) in Dirac’s paper) is inconsistent
with his claim to have derived “Schro¨dinger’s wave equation for Hamiltoni-
ans that involve time explicitly” (p. 636). In discussing this equation, (Dar-
rigol, 1993, p. 341) presents an alternative derivation (not Dirac’s) which
follows Dirac’s earlier paper in assuming that H is a constant of the mo-
tion. However, it is quite clear that this was not Dirac’s intention. This is
a puzzle. What could Dirac have meant by this claim?
It is very plausible that Dirac had just made a mistake in his deriva-
tion. Dirac’s comment about the lack of energy eigenfunctions, and the
dependence of H on t, indicates that he begins by considering solutions of
the ‘extended’ Schro¨dinger equation that lie in the extended configuration
space, for which there are no eigenfunctions. He begins the derivation (p.
635) by considering the Hamiltonian at an instant t = τ , and the correspond-
ing instantaneous variables qτ , pτ . Functions of qτ and pτ do not involve
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time explicitly, and so we can regard the Heisenberg equation of motion (for
variation in τ) as acting on these functions. From this it follows that
Hτ (q
′
τα
′) = i~
∂(q′τ/α′)
∂τ
.
However, Dirac immediately suggests (p. 636) that we write t for τ and q for
qτ , which removes the time dependence of Hτ and gives (6). Thus does Dirac
arrive at the time-dependent equation for a time independent Hamiltonian.
This mistake is actually quite telling: Dirac does not yet have a concep-
tion of a time varying state, and so he is compelled to interpret this equation
as one in which the Hamiltonian varies. But, comparing (5) with (6), we see
that what he had found was that the variation of the state (q′/α′) in time
is given by the Hamiltonian operator in the position representation (rather
than the energy representation). As Dirac was aware, the space of instan-
taneous solutions was the only one in which his transformations could be
defined, but it is clear that these instantaneous spaces are to be reached by
fixing a particular value of the variable t in the larger space and considering
variation with respect to a parameterization of that value.
The alternative was to consider a full blown four-dimensional wave equa-
tion applying to functions of time and space, a much more formidable prob-
lem. The middle ground that Dirac had found (apparently by accident) by
dealing with the problem in this manner was taken by him to correspond
to a time varying Hamiltonian, but he had instead derived the equation for
a time varying state, where the Hamiltonian may (or may not) vary with
time. Yet at no point in the paper does he entertain the thought that the
wavefunction can vary in time without variation of the Hamiltonian.
Why did he not immediately recognize this? At this time—before he
became aware of Hilbert space methods—Dirac did not possess the mod-
ern notion of a quantum state as a vector state. Moreover, the notion of a
(Schro¨dinger picture) instantaneous state was one that he was to remain re-
sistant to: specifying a time parameterization served to break relativistic in-
variance, and meant leaving the extended phase space.5 It seems clear that,
for Dirac, the state of the system was to be defined in terms of the extended
configuration space, and from there the time evolution of the ‘constants of
integration’ (here, quantum variables) could be specified. In essence, this
5The modern notion of state only appeared in the second edition of Dirac’s Principles
of Quantum Mechanics. See (Brown, 2006, p. 402-403) for more details. Also note that,
contrary to Hilgevoord’s claim that “this view disappeared from his later work” (Hilgevo-
ord, 2005, pp. 36–37), the use of the extended phase space was essential to Dirac’s work
on constrained Hamiltonian Mechanics, e.g. Dirac (1966).
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resembles the modern Heisenberg picture, but without the restriction that
observable quantities (quantum variables) are evaluated at an instant. Ac-
cording to Dirac’s interpretation, the theory gave information at the level
of time averages.
2.3 The Time of a Quantum Jump
The question of whether time and energy are conjugate variables is closely
related to the existence of a time-energy uncertainty principle. Reading
Heisenberg’s famous “anschaulichen Inhalt” paper today (Heisenberg, 1927),
one is struck by the centrality of the time-energy uncertainty relation rather
than the position-momentum uncertainty relation in his informal discussions
of the “intuitive content” of the theory. It is clear that this relation is central
to Hesienberg’s attempt to articulate a physical interpretation of the theory.
As he was to later put it: “I wanted to start from the fact that quantum
mechanics as we then knew it [i.e. matrix mechanics] already imposed a
unique physical interpretation” (from Duncan & Janssen, p. 5).
Looking more closely, we see that Heisenberg’s concern is not with time
in the abstract (i.e., on a par with “space”) but rather the relationship
between the energy of the system and the time of a particular event—a
“quantum jump” regarded as a real physical process. Take the following
passage:
“According to the intuitive interpretation of quantum theory
attempted here, the points in time at which transitions—the
“quantum jumps”—occur should be experimentally determinable
in a concrete manner, such as energies of stationary states, for
instance. The precision to which such a point in time can be
determined is . . .h/∆E, if ∆E is the change in energy accompa-
nying the transition.” (p. 189)
This illustrates his faith that the observable content of the theory should
be fixed by theory, but also seems to indicate that his view was that these
quantum jumps took place at determinate moments of time, albeit times
about which we have limited knowledge. Moreover, Heisenberg discusses
how the possibility of measuring the energy precisely depends on performing
a measurement between the moments at which jumps occurred.
In quantum mechanics, such a behavior [of quantized periodic
motion] is to be interpreted as follows: since the energy is really
changed, due to other disturbances or to quantum jumps, each
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energy measurement has to be performed in the interval between
two disturbances, if it is to be unequivocal. (p. 194)
The implication is that a quantum system is to be understood as having
a determinate energy at all times, but that this energy fluctuates due to
exchanges with the environment — quantum jumps. This was the view
he had taken in his previous paper regarding energy exchanges between
two coupled systems, which had inspired Dirac’s transformation theory.6
Given this view, we come to appreciate why the time-energy uncertainty
relation has such a central role for the interpretation of the theory: since
Heisenberg regarded the physical content of the theory as corresponding to
discontinuous processes of energy exchange occurring at definite times, the
energy-time relation was naturally of central importance to his project of
providing an intuitive grasp of the physical content of the new quantum
mechanics.
It is also of interest that Jordan’s view at this time is very similar to
Heisenberg’s, and one can imagine that this is something that they had
discussed together.
What predictions can our theory make on this point? The most
obvious answer is that the theory only gives averages, and can
tell us, on the average, how many quantum jumps will occur
in any interval of time. Thus, we must conclude, the theory
gives the probability that a jump will occur at a given moment;
and thus, so we might be led to conclude, the exact moment is
indeterminate, and all we have is a probability for the jump. But
this last conclusion does not necessarily follow from the preceding
one: it is an additional hypothesis (Jordan 1927, from Duncan
and Janssen p. 17).
It seems plausible that Jordan is taking here a similar view to Heisenberg,
the view that quantum jumps are physical events taking place at the some
definite time. In the first part of the answer, he seems to approach Dirac’s
opinion that “[the theory] enables one to calculate the fraction of the total
time during which the energy has any particular value, but it can give no
information about the times of the transitions” (Dirac, 1927, p. 622). But
Jordan goes further to say that there is information here about the rate of
occurrence of quantum jumps. He goes even further in suggesting that the
theory might be considered to supply information about the probability that
6See (Duncan & Janssen, 2012, pp. 3-8) for more details.
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a jump might occur at a particular time. This is distinguished from the view
that the moment of time at which the jump occurs is indeterminate, leav-
ing open the possibility that the probabilities involved could be interpreted
epistemically rather than objectively.
The major technical contribution of Heisenberg’s paper concerns the
derivation of the position-momentum uncertainty relation from the Dirac-
Jordan transformation theory. On the other hand, the time-energy relation
(stated without proof on p. 177) followed intuitively from the quantization of
action-angle variables in classical theory, assumed to form a conjugate pair in
the quantum theory (presumably motivated by the classical analogy detailed
in my Section 2.1). However, the early form of Jordan’s transformation
theory was particularly encouraging for the prospects of a parallel deriva-
tion of the time-energy relation along the lines of the position-momentum
derivation, since it assumed (in modern parlance) that canonically conjugate
observables have purely continuous spectra spanning the real line. This is
a necessary condition for observables to allow the derivation of a standard
uncertainty principle in modern quantum mechanics, but it does not hold
of typical Hamiltonians (as Pauli later pointed out).
2.4 The 1927 Solvay Conference: The Fate of the Quantum
Jump
The period of time during which this ‘quantum jump’ interpretation of the
theory remained plausible was short-lived. By the time of Heisenberg’s
presentation with Born at the Solvay conference of October 1927 he no
longer held this interpretation of the physical meaning of the time of a
quantum jump. Born and Heisenberg’s presentation contains the following
passage,
If one asks the question when a quantum jump occurs, the theory
provides no answer. At first it seemed that there was a gap here
that might be filled with further probing. But soon it became
apparent that this is not so, rather, that it is a failure of prin-
ciple, which is deeply anchored in the nature of the possibility
of physical knowledge. One sees that quantum mechanics yields
mean values correctly, but cannot predict the occurrence of an
individual event. (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 2006, p. 420)
This seems to represent a retreat to Dirac’s position that only the time
average was a physically meaningful quantity. However, the rest of their
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presentation reveals a more radical point of view. Bacciagaluppi and Valen-
tini read their claim that “matrix mechanics deals only with closed periodic
systems, and in these there are no changes. In order to have true processes
. . . one must restrict one’s attention to a part of the system” (Bacciagaluppi
& Valentini, 2006, pp. 205–6) to suggest that they shared the view of Camp-
bell (endorsed by Heisenberg in a letter to Pauli) that time is a statistical
phenomenon, absent in atomic systems but emerging at the macroscopic
level like temperature or pressure.
Since the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation is solved by the sta-
tionary states corresponding to eigenfunctions of energy, if one makes the
supposition that a system is always in such a state and the theory supplies
probabilities for the ‘jump’ from one state to another, then it would be as
if time did not exist except for these discontinuous transitions. Though
Schro¨dinger introduces it only to reject it, his report contains a detailed
analysis of this proposal, in which quantum systems considered as a whole
involve no passage of time, and according to which time emerges from the
theory as a macroscopic parameter related to the number of quantum jumps
occurring between subsystems. According to this view, there is no change,
and thus no passage of time in between quantum jumps (p. 207), and time
rather emerges as a parameter related to the rate at which jumps occur.
Limiting our attention to an isolated system, we would not per-
ceive the passage of time in it any more than we can notice its
possible progress in space. . . . What we would notice would be
merely a sequence of discontinuous transitions, so to speak a cin-
ematic image, but without the possibility of comparing the time
intervals between transitions. (p. 207)
According to Campbell’s hypothesis, “one cannot regard the jump proba-
bility in the usual way as the probability of a transition calculated relative
to unit time.” (p. 451) On this view, the theory supplies probabilities for
transitions between states and in terms of temporal information can only
provide probabilities that one transition occur before or after another.
The alternative, says Schro¨dinger, is to regard the system not as occupy-
ing a single stationary state (along the lines of Bohr’s earlier atomic theory)
but rather as having a state that may be an arbitrary linear superposition
of energy eigenstates. Taking this view—which was, of course, the view to
win out—time appears in terms of the evolution of the relative phases of the
eigenstates, decomposed relative to a particular basis. Now there is more
to say here about the emergence of the modern notion of state, some of
which is covered by Duncan & Janssen (2012), but we can see that already
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these developments were fatal to the idea of the quantum jump as a discon-
tinuous transition between stationary states, which relied critically on the
hypothesis that a system remain in an energy eigenstate at all times.
3 In Defense of the Notion of the Time of an Event
It is clear that (with respect to von Neumann’s Hilbert space formalism)
these expectations regarding the role of time in the theory were false: time
and energy are not conjugate variables, the Schro¨dinger equation is defined
for functions of space alone, and there is no such thing as the time of a quan-
tum jump (or collapse).7 Nonetheless, I have shown that the motivations
of the authors were not simply the result of conceptual confusion (although
later physicists may have been misled along those lines), and so Hilgevo-
ord’s (2005) rejoinder that time already has an appropriate representation
in the theory as a parameter is misguided. Taking a sympathetic reading
of their motivations, I will show that these expectations can be physically
motivated, and can in fact be met with minimal mutilation of the existing
formalism. Thus the fact that the standard textbook presentation of quan-
tum mechanics is inhospitable to the introduction of ‘time’ as an observable
need not be read as a prohibition on the introduction of the time of an event
as an observable quantity.
The initial motivation of Heisenberg to regard the time of a quantum
jump as an experimentally meaningful quantity was the idea that a quan-
tum system remains in a stationary state of definite energy, except when it
instantaneously transitions to another stationary state. So if the energy of
the system could be shown experimentally to have changed from one value
to another, then a quantum jump must have occurred in the meantime (p.
191), and the time at which it had occurred could be experimentally de-
termined (up to an uncertainty depending on the energy difference). It
was thus natural for Jordan to regard the transformation theory as provid-
ing probabilities for such transitions to occur within a particular interval
of time. I claim that, while the requirement that a system be in an energy
eigenstate at all times was mistaken, the idea that the theory should provide
probabilities for events to occur during intervals of time as well in regions
of space was not.
To take a straightforward example, consider an experiment consisting
7Of course, the dynamics of the theory can be modified to bring about the stochastic
collapse process at particular moments of time, but I will not consider these alternative
dynamics.
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of a single radioactive atom and a Geiger counter that fully surrounds it.
If the half-life of the atom is 1 hour, then the probability that the counter
clicks in the first hour is 1/2, the probability it clicks in the second hour
1/4, the probability it decays in the third hours is 1/8, and so on. Thus the
probability that the counter clicks at some point in the future is given by
an arithmetic sequence that tends to one as t tends to infinity. However,
once the counter has been observed to click, the probability that it clicks in
the future in zero. This is evidently a experimentally meaningful situation,
and we should expect that this phenomenological law may be derived from
a detailed quantum mechanical description of the decay process. However,
within the standard account of measurement there is provably no way to
implement this simple scheme.
This description would involve a (Heisenberg picture) quantum mechani-
cal state ψ in a Hilbert space H, a Hamiltonian H describing the time evolu-
tion of the system, and a series of operators T1, T2, T3 such that 〈ψ|T1ψ〉 =
1/2, 〈ψ|T2ψ〉 = 1/4, and 〈ψ|T3ψ〉 = 1/8. Since the theory has a time
translation symmetry implemented by the unitary group eiHt, we have that
T2 = e
−iHtT1eiHt and T3e−iHtT2eiHt, where t is one hour. Even this bare
bones sketch is enough to tell us something interesting about the opera-
tors Ti: if H is a self-adjoint operator with spectrum bounded from below
8
then it follows that 〈ψ|Ti+1Ti|ψ〉 6= 0 and so these operators Ti cannot be
projections onto mutually orthogonal subspaces of H.9
Thus there is no mixed state decomposition in terms of states ψi such
that Tiψi = ψi, in which case the ψi would correspond to the system de-
caying during distinct intervals of time, and neither can the Ti together
serve to define a self-adjoint ‘time of decay’ operator. The former implica-
tion indicates the von Neumann’s collapse postulate cannot be applied to
this situation; the latter than his identification of observables of the theory
with self-adjoint operators is ill-suited to include the time of an event as an
observable quantity. Yet there seems every reason to suppose that the the-
ory should be able to answer questions like, “When will the Geiger counter
click?” or in a diffraction experiment, say, “When will a dot appear on the
screen?” In failing to answer these questions, the theory would be fail to be
empirically adequate. This failure would constitute a real ‘problem of time’
for the theory. But this problem can be overcome, and without modifying
the dynamics: The problem is not with the way that quantum mechanics
8This corresponds to the assumption that the is a value of energy for the system below
which it cannot drop.
9For a proof this result see Unruh & Wald (1989).
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defines the state of the system, but the way that probabilities are derived
from the state.
The first thing to note is that in the identification of observables with
self-adjoint operators it is assumed that these these operators act instan-
taneously. In the Schro¨dinger picture (in which the states vary with time)
the expectation value of an operator A in the state ψt is 〈ψt|A|ψt〉, whereas
in the Heisenberg picture (in which the observables vary with time) the ex-
pectation value of an operator is 〈ψ|e−iHtAeiHt|ψ〉. (These return the same
values since |ψt〉 = eiHt|ψ〉.) In the Schro¨dinger picture it makes very little
sense to ask when a particular event occurs (in the sense of a probability
for it occurring during some interval of time) since we may only interrogate
the state at a moment of time. However, in the Heisenberg picture we may
define operators that involve more than one moment of time by integrating
over t.
Consider an instantaneous measurement of position. The existence of
a self-adjoint position observable implies the existence of an assignment of
projection operators P∆ to regions of space ∆ such that disjoint regions of
space correspond to mutually orthogonal subspaces. In the Heisenberg pic-
ture, an instantaneous measurement of P∆ at time t apparently corresponds
to asking the question “is the system located in ∆ at time t?” The proba-
bility of finding a positive answer is 〈ψ|e−iHtP∆eiHt|ψ〉, and if the system
is found to be in ∆ then the state is updated accordingly by the projection
operator P∆(t) = e
−iHtP∆eiHt.
To consider a measurement that takes place over more that one instant,
we can integrate these operators over t. The most straightforwardly defined
of these operators is the dwell time operator,10 whose expectation value
corresponds to something like the proportion of time that a system spends
within a region ∆,
Td =
∫ ∞
−∞
P∆(t)dt.
But while this is a self-adjoint operator (albeit one whose measurement in
a concrete experimental situation is questionable), it is not appropriate for
describing the time of an event since it does not assign probabilities to times
(or time intervals).
Consider instead a cloud chamber experiment where we set up a detector
that is sensitive to the presence of high energy particles, with the chamber
located in ∆. The presence of the particle will be registered by an ionization
event, which is recorded by a photosensitive emulsion. For a given state ψ
10See Jose Munoz et al. (2010) for a recent discussion.
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we want to obtain the probability that the detector fires during some interval
I = [t1, t2], given that it fires at all. The obvious candidate for an operator
that corresponds to the presence of a particle within ∆ during a time interval
[t1, t2] is
T∆(I) =
∫ t2
t1
P∆(t)dt,
but this operator is not normalized. Nonetheless, if we assume that the
particle will be detected at some time (and exactly once) then the normal-
ization is provided by the dwell time operator, which, being self-adjoint, has
a unique square root Td = (T
1/2
d ). Using the inverse of this operator, we
define
E∆(I) = T
−1/2
d E∆([t1, t2])T
−1/2
d ,
which returns the identity when I = R. With this ‘operator normalization’
the quantity 〈ψ|E∆(I)|ψ〉 can be interpreted as giving the probability that
the event occurs during I rather than at some other time.11
The operators E∆(I) together form a Positive Operator Valued Measure
(POVM) which maps temporal intervals I to positive operators on H.12
However, these operators are not mutually orthogonal projections and can-
not form a Projection Valued Measure (PVM); in general, a POVM that
covaries with time translations E∆(I) = e
−iHtE∆(I − t)eiHt cannot be a
PVM.13 Since the self-adjoint operators on H are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the set of PVMs, there is no self-adjoint operator corresponding
to the operators E∆(I) (in the same sense that the position operator Q
corresponds to the projections P∆). Thus von Neumann’s association of
observables with self-adjoint operators would exclude these event time ob-
servables.
But it is not surprising that this is so since in von Neumann’s measure-
ment schema the measurement of an observable takes place at an instant,
i.e. under the condition that the time is t. The usual probabilities given by
an observable are conditional probabilities in the following sense: they are
probabilities which are valid given that the time is t. On the other hand,
the event time observable is ‘measured’ over an interval of time by leaving
11This operator normalization scheme is suggested by Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002)
and has been interpreted (Busch, 2007) in terms of the amount of time that the system
spends in the region ∆ during I, but to do so ignores the physical meaning of the nor-
malization. The more natural interpretation, I claim, is in terms of the probability of a
detection event, given that such an event will certainly occur.
12See Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002) for a proof of this in general.
13See Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi (1981).
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the experiment set up and waiting for it to register an event. The condi-
tion under which such a experiment takes place is that such an event will
occur sooner or later, i.e., the probabilities provided by E∆(I) are also con-
ditional probabilities, with the condition being that the event takes place
exactly once over all of time. The incompatibility of these normalization
conditions indicates that they correspond to incompatible measurements.
But how many experiments take place at an instant of time? If we are judg-
ing by empirical relevance, I suggest that the conditionalization required by
event time observables is more apt—only a poor detection experiment ends
without a detection event.
These observables have a close relation to the screen observables of
Werner (1986), which generalize the quantum time of arrival.14 Screen ob-
servables apply to a typical diffraction experiment where an electron, say, is
emitted and some time later detected at a photoluminescent screen. Since
the screen is sensitive to the presence of an electron at all times, and elec-
trons in an ensemble will be detected at different times, an instantaneous
position observable cannot suffice to describe even the spatial distribution
of detection events. For these screen observables, one assumes again that
the detector will fire at some time t, and so the sum of the probability of
detection over all times is unity. Again, very few experimental arrangements
(if any) correspond to anything like an instantaneous position measurement,
which would provide probabilities for a detector spread out through all of
space which fires exactly once when switched on for an instant.
The main puzzle that is raised by event time observables such as these
is, in my view, one of providing a suitable update rule. While POVMs play
the same predictive role as PVMs15, event time POVMs are particularly
ill-suited to supplying the means to update the state, which is typically
defined for projectors through Lu¨ders Rule, which projects the state into
the eigenspace of the measured eigenvalue (normalizing according to the
trace). However, the very normalization of the POVM E∆(R) = I which
made it suitable for its role as an event time observable makes it ill-suited
to provide probabilities for events that occur subsequent to detection. For
example, it is unclear that we can obtain a definite answer to the question:
what is the probability that the particle is first detected in ∆ during I
and subsequently in ∆′? To answer this question appears to require a new
normalization scheme since now the particle is detected in both ∆ and ∆′,
14This has been a topic of much research. See Muga & Leavens (2000) for a review.
15As with a projection, a normalized positive operator E supplies probabilities through
taking the trace of the density operator ρ, Tr[ρE].
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i.e., twice. But if we normalize along those lines then we have lost the
conditional nature of the probabilities desired: the question was, what is the
probability of finding the particle in ∆′ given that it was already detected
in ∆?
For answering such questions, we must go beyond operator normaliza-
tion and instead consider the extended Schro¨dinger equation, defined for
functions of time and space as Dirac originally envisioned it,
(H −W )ψ(x, t) = 0.
The problem with this equation is that the operator (H −W ) has a con-
tinuous spectrum, and so there is no vector ψ(x, t) ∈ L2[R4] = H+ which
is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 0. However, as Dirac had claimed, energy
(−W ) and time are conjugate variables on this space of functions of space
and time. Without going into the details, recent work by Brunetti et al.
(2010) has shown how solutions to this equation may be written in terms of
linear functionals rather than vectors. While these physical solutions don’t
form a Hilbert space, and define non-normalizable ‘weights’ on the algebra
of observables of H+ rather than algebraic states, there is a construction
which, given an operator on H+ representing the occurrence of an event,
leads to a GNS Hilbert space representation giving the expectation values
for the algebra of observables on the condition that the event in question
did occur.
Since time is a self-adjoint operator on H+ (which, remember, is not
the space of solutions of the extended Schro¨dinger equation), the event time
operators such as T∆(I) are projections in this space. By conditionalizing
on these events, one can calculate probabilities for subsequent events, such
as another detector firing elsewhere. This theory has a good claim to be re-
garded as a straightforward generalization of the usual Schro¨dinger dynam-
ics. First, by setting up an appropriate map from H+ to H, the projections
T∆(I) become the operator normalized time POVM E∆(I). Second, and
most importantly, the predictions of the usual Schro¨dinger picture descrip-
tion are returned in the instantaneous limit. But note that the differences
between the instantaneous form and the extended form are significant: the
solutions of the extended Schro¨dinger equation do not form a Hilbert space,
and there is no meaning to the phrase ‘the state of the system’ without first
specifying an event, the occurrence of which can be used to give a probability
assignment to further events. Thus such probability assignments correspond
to a conditional state.
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4 Coda: The Philosophy of Time
What does this have to do with the metaphysics of time? The great debate
over the nature of time in fundamental physics began with the correspon-
dence of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. Against the New-
tonian view of time as a substantive physical entity (substantivalism) — the
“container view” of space-time — Leibniz argued that time is nothing more
than the temporal relations between independently existing events (relation-
ism). Recent discussions of the role of time in cosmological theories (e.g.,
Barbour (1999)) have tended to take the line that philosophical consider-
ations demand the elimination of time from physical theories, or at least
reduction of time to some other quantity with respect to which change may
be defined. However, it is implausible that Leibniz intended to deny the ex-
istence of time. For example, he wrote that “time is the order that makes it
possible for events to have a chronology among themselves when they occur
at different times,” which is inconsistent with a reductive or eliminativist
account of temporal relations.16
Instead, Leibniz believed that time is nothing above and beyond the
temporal ordering relations that exist between events: “times, considered
without the things or events, are nothing at all, and . . . consist only in the
successive order of things and events.” This view was in stark contrast
to Clarke, who maintained that “time is not merely the order of things
succeeding each other, because the quantity of time may be greater or less
while the order of events remains the same.” Thus what Clarke affirmed
and Leibniz denied was the metrical structure of time; in a world consisting
of successive events with a single linear temporal order, Clarke believed that
one could (in principle) measure the amount of time between two successive
events, whereas according to Leibniz this is a meaningless notion—once
given the temporal orderings of events we have all there is to say about the
temporal facts.
In ordinary quantum mechanics (the Dirac-von Neumann formalism)
time features as a parameter that indexes the states (Schro¨dinger picture)
or the observables (Heisenberg picture). In the Schro¨dinger picture, the
natural way to view the time indexed states is as describing the same physical
system at distinct moments of time. This seems to describe a world in which
time is continuously valued, having the structure of the real line. It is hard
to see how such a world could be made compatible with Leibniz’s view of
time as nothing but the temporal relations between events. But if we view
16All quotations are from translations at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/.
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the formalism as a means for providing probabilities for the occurrence of
events in time, as I have suggested, we obtain a view of the world much more
hospitable to Leibniz’s contention that time is just the temporal ordering
relations between (possible and actual) events.
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